Some past events are best not remembered, particularly by people with ruminative tendencies. Intentional forget ting is, therefore, a skill that is worth developing, and a rea sonable method is to practice not thinking the unwanted thought whenever a previously effective cue is encountered. However, this method does not guarantee later forget ting, as has been illustrated by outcomes from the think/ no-think paradigm used by Anderson and Green (200 I) .
After the participants in the experiments by Anderson and Green (200 1) had studied pairs of unrelated nouns, they spent a variable number of trials either rehearsing or suppressing second-item nouns (responses) when cued with the first. On each suppression trial, they were in structed not to think about the response term when the cue appeared on the screen. The final test, requesting re call of all responses, rehearsed and suppressed, revealed below-baseline recall of suppressed responses. Suppressed responses were recalled less well than responses for which cues were never presented between initial learning and the final test. Still, average recall in the most successful sup pression conditions hovered around 70%. Although this level of forgetting is impressive, considering the param eters of suppression practice in the paradigm, clearly there is room for improvement.
The responses to be suppressed in the think/no-think paradigm are akin to unwanted thoughts. Unwanted thoughts might be subjected to ironic control processes (Wegner, 1994) , whereby checking for success in inhibiting the thought ushers it in once again. To avoid this revolv ing door, people sometimes stumble upon the technique of thinking about something else when cues for the un wanted thought come to mind. The technique is likely to aid forgetting, because it is analogous to the experimen tal paradigm of retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson & Spellman, 1995) , in which rehearsal of items related to category cues prevents later recall of other previously studied items in the same categories. More generally, the strategy of thinking about something else is one of de liberately introducing retroactive interference effects in the remembering of unwanted thoughts. (See Anderson & Neely, 1996 , for a review of retrieval-induced forget ting situated in the context of the interference literature.)
The relation between success in the think/no-think paradigm and the use of thought substitutes is the issue that motivated the present experiment. Our cues for re sponding or suppressing were adjectives with meaning ful relations to both the original response term and the substitute response (see also Hertel & Gerstle, 2003) . Apart from characterizing the nature of cuing in real world settings, meaningful relations. between the cues and the responses seemed particularly important in speed ing the learning of the cue substitute pairs during the sup pression phase. We examined the effect of learning to use these substitutes on subsequent recall of the originally learned responses. To reduce response competition, in structions on the final test permitted recall of both orig inal responses and substitutes (akin to the MMFR test developed by Barnes & Underwood, 1959) . We also ex amined the correlation between the uninstructed use of a substitution strategy and success in suppression under typical no-think conditions. Copyright 2005 Psychonomic Society, Inc.
METHOD

Materials
As in the experiment by Hertel and Gerstle (2003) , related adjective-noun pairs were selected from those used by Hertel and Parks (2002) . All 36 nouns were four to seven letters long (M = 5.3), with concreteness and imageability ratings greater than 5 (M = 6.4, on 7-point scales from Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968) , emotion ality ratings less than 4 (M = 3.1 ), and goodness ratings between 3 and 5 (M = 4.5, on 7'-point scales from Rubin & Friendly, 1986) . All those characteristics� plus frequency of occurrence (M = 67 .5; Kucera & Francis, 1967) , were used to distribute the nouns in a bal anced fashion into six sets of six nouns each. Each noun was ac companied by an emotionally neutral adjective (e.g., porcelain doll, security o f ficer, racing hound), and the six sets were balanced on ratings of emotionality for the pairs (M = 4.3 on a 9-point scale rang ing from extremely positive to extremely negative; Hertel & Parks, 2002) . All the pairs were used in the learning phase. Subsequently, three sets were assigned to suppression (baseline or 0 cue presen tations, 2 presentations, and 12 presentations), and three sets were assigned to responding (0, 2, and 12). Filler items consisted of I 0 additional neutral adjective-noun pairs from the same pool. · Substitute� to be used in the aided condition of suppression con:.. sisted of new nouns associated with the original adjectives (in our judgment). Examples include porcelain goblet, security vehicle; and racing costume. The substituted nouns averaged 5:7 letters long, 6.7 in concreteness, 2.5 in emotionality, 4.1 in ·goodness, and 69.3 in frequency. The six sets of six original pairs were also balanced on these measures for the substitutes.
Participants and Design
Under the constraint of equal cell sizes, 72 students ( 48 women and 24 men) were randomly assigned to the una : ided or aided condition of suppression. I Within each condition, equal numbers within each gender were then assigned to the six counterbalancing conditions for rotating material sets across the factorial· combination of in structions (respond vs. suppress) and number of cue presentations (0, 2, and 12).
Procedure
All tasks were implemented on Superlab Pro software. Most de tails of the procedure replicated those used by Hertel and Gerstle (2003 ) , which were based on Anderson and Green (200 1 ).
Learning phase. We presented each word pair in black font, centered on the screen, for 5 sec, during which time the participant created a self-referential mental image involving the concept denoted by the pair. (Beforehand, we gave them the example pair sandy beach and suggested that they might imagine themselves walking along a sandy beach.) Next, the rated meaningfu!ness of the image was reported aloud and keyed by the experimenter. The order of presentation, constant across participants, consisted of six random ized blocks of seven pairs (one pair from each of the six sets, plus one filler pair). Tw o additional filler pairs were placed at the beginning of the list, and two at the end. 50% of the responses on the first assessment were correct, another test was administered (for a maximum of three cycles with differ ent orders within blocks of seven cues). All the participants achieved the criterion by three tests.
Suppression-training phase. We instructed all the participants that they would again see cue words, but this time the words would be presented in eith�r green or red font. They were asked to respond to green cues with the responses, as they had done during the pre vious assessment. To red cues, they were asked to continue to attend but to avoid saying or even thinking about the associated response
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word. Nine filler cues appeared in green, once or twice each, and one cue appeared in red eight times (for suppression practice). In the aided condition, we gave the participants a substitute to recall when the red cue appeared and told them it would help them not to think about the response word. Other procedural details duplicated those used in the main suppression phase. At the end of the training phase, a short questionnaire assessed whether the participant understood the procedure, and corrections were provided if necessary. Immediately before the main suppression phase, the aided partic ipants viewed the 12 randomly ordered cue substitute pairs for 3 sec each. They were instructed to learn them in whatever way they pre ferred but never to think about the original response to each cue.
Suppression phase. In the main suppression phase, green cues for responding 2 or 12 times and red cues for suppressing 2 or 12 times were presented for a total of 168 trials. Six filler cues for respond ing (used during practice) were also each presented 12 times, in green, for an additional 72 trials. The trials were randomly ordered and separated by a 400-msec intertrial interval (ITI). Each trial was an nounced by a set of small crosses for 200 msec. The cue was then presented for 3 sec (or less, if the participant responded sooner). In correct or absent responses on response trials were followed by a 500-msec display ofthe response word in blue font. Responses to a cue for suppression initiated the display of very large redXs, followed by a 500-msec display of the substitute in the aided condition.
Final test phase. The constant test order consisted of four filler cues, then six randomized blocks of one cue from each of the six sets. On each trial, following a 200-msec display of crosses, the cue was displayed for 4 sec (or less, if the participant responded sooner'). The ITI was 400 msec, and no feedback was given. The par ticipants were asked to recall the initial response word for each cue, regardless of prior instructions. In both conditions, they were told that if more than one word should come to mind, they might say that other word as well and not be concerned about which one was correct. In the aided condition, we added the explanation that, be cause they had also learned substitutes for some of the cues, they might say both initial responses and substitutes aloud. Everyone was reminded that it. was very important to recall the correct re sponse word from the first part of the experiment.
Strategy questionnaire. After the final test, we asked the par ticipants to fill out a questionnaire concerning strategies for sup pression. Table 1 lists the items. The first three were obtained from Michael Anderson (personal communication, May 18, 2002) , and we added the last two. Each item was followed by a scale-0 (never), 1 (rarely), 2 (sometimes), 3 (frequently), and 4 (very frequently}-and the participants were instructed to circle a num ber that represented their use of th . e strategy.
RESULTS
Overall Analysis
The mean percentages of response words recalled on the final test are depicted in Figure 1 . The percentages were submitted to a mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA), with a between-subjects factor for the condi tion for suppression (unaided vs. aided) and within subjects factors for instruction during the suppression phase (suppress vs. respond) and the number of times that the cues were presented (0, 2, or 12).2 The signifi cance level was set at .05. Significant main effects qual ified by significant interactions are. not reported.
The effect of instruction (suppress vs. respond) de pended on the number of times the cues were presented [F(2,96) = 27.25, MSe = 217.34,p < .00 1] . As was antic ipated, this interaction was qualified by the higher order interaction of instruction and cue presentation with sup- Made sure I still knew the associated word first, and then tried to not think of this associated word. Tried to not think of the associated response, but then after the trial was over I made sure I still remembered the response word. Kept myself from saying the response word aloud, but kept repeating the response word to myself to improve my memory for it.
Kept myself from thinking about the original response word by thinking about something else (another word or image, for example). Figure 1 shows that forgetting was aided by the provi sion of substitutes in both the 2-and the 12-presentation conditions. In the unaided condition, the mean percentages of suppressed responses recalled were 82, 83, and 82 (for 0, 2, and 12 cue presentations, respectively). The corre sponding means in the aided condition were 83, 70, and 68. Clearly, below-baseline suppression obtained only in the aided condition [F( l ,30) = 27 .95, MSe = 248.46,
Compliance in the Unaided Condition
Next, to evaluate the lack-of below-baseline suppres sion in the unaided condition; we included a factor for how well the participants reportedly complied with suppres sion instructions. Their responses to the first three items on the strategy questionnaire were summed to constitute a score for noncompliance. A median split on these scores within each counterbalancing condition produced the noncompliance factor,3 which was included in an A NOVA, along with within-subjects factors for instruction (respond vs. suppress) and number of cue presentations. The three way interaction was significant [F(2,48) = 5. 36, MSe = 156.25,p < .01]. Figure 2 shows that only the participants who reported lower use of strategies in conflict with suppression in structions produced below -baseline suppression, accord ing to a comparison of baseline with 2 and 12 cue pre sentations [F(l, 12} = 4.85, MSe = 420.52,p < .05]. The means were 88% (baseline), 7 4% (2 presentations), and 80% ( 12 presentations). However, the comparison be tween baseline and recall of responses suppressed 12 times was nonsignificant, perhaps due to low power. In contrast, the noncompliant participants tended to recall responses that they had been instructed to suppress more frequently than baseline responses [F( l, 12) = 3.69, MSe = 706.02, p < .08]. The means were 75% (baseline), 92% (2 pre sentations), and 82% ( 12 presentations). Again, the com parison between baseline and recall of responses "sup pressed" 12 times was nonsignificant.
Thought Substitution in the Unaided Condition
We examined the correlation between ratings on Item 4 on the strategy questionnaire (kep t myself from thinking about the original response word by thinking about something else) and the size of the instruction effect (the number recalled from all cues for responding minus the number recalled from all cues for suppression, omitting baseline data). to account for success in suppression: was not an artifact of whether the participant complied with instructions.
As an illustration of the advantage of substitution, me dian splits within each counterbalancing conditi()n iden tified low and high users of this strategy.4 The average rating was 2.2 (sometimes) in the low-use group and 3.9 in the high-use group (very frequently). Although per forming an ANOVA with the dichotomized substitution strategy as a factor lacks the power of the regression analysis, it was performed to address the issue of below baseline suppression. As is shown in Figure 3 
Number of Cue· Presentations 
Recall of Substitutes in the Aided Condition
On the final test, the aided participants recalled an av erage of 34% of the substitutes used twice and 56% of those used 12 times[F(1,24) = 16.50,MSe = 374.23,p < .001]. Recall instructions emphasized the importance of recall ing the original response words but merely permitted the recall of substitutes, so these levels are likely to underes timate participants' ability to recall substitutes if the im portance of doing so is stressed.
Recall of substitutes did not clearly predict the forget ting of original responses on a trial-by-trial basis. When substitutes were recalled,, they were accompanied by original responses oil. 56% of the trials (SD = 40. 7 . 3).
Out of the trials during which the participants failed to recall the original response, only 54% of the substitutes were recalled (SD = 36.37):
DISCUSSION
According to these results, our advice to those who want to forget is to think about something else that can be SUBSTITUTES AID FORGETTING 487 meaningfully related to the cue most likely to invoke the unwanted memory. This is the advice derived from exper iments on retrieval-induced forgetting, as well as from ex periments on retroactive interference in general, and it now applies to situations in which unwanted thoughts are de liberately suppressed.
The provision of substitutes in this experiment caused more forgetting of suppressed responses than did the in struction merely . to suppress thoughts of the to� be forgotten responses . . Importantly, substitutes were pro vided in addition to the typical suppression instructions used by Anderson and Green (200 1 ) , and the instructions emphasized the importance of never thinking about the original responses during the learning of the substitutes. Otherwise, retrieval-induced forgetting would likely be impaired by relations between the responses to each cue (see Anderson & McCulloch, 1999) . The primary em phasis on the suppression of initial responses also makes the results in the aided condition not merely a replica tion of classic retroactive interference experiments but, instead, shows· how retroactive. interference can con tribute to intentional forgetting. .
One possible explanation for the effect of substitutes is that there was simply more to be remembered-36 ini tial responses and 12 substitutes. Against this explana tion, we found similar ceiling levels for the recall of re sponded items in both groups, as well as a significant correlation between the instruction effect and the self- 
Number of Cue Presentations initiated strategy of thinking about something else. An other possible explanation can be derived from a response competition or blocking fr�mework. Although we used self-paced recall, invited the report of both response words in the aided condition, and stressed the impor tance of recalling the original, response competition can not be ruled out. It is also possible that some · participants were satisfied with the recall of just one response, the more recent one, or that the initial response sometimes underwent output interference from the person's having produced the substitute first on the final test trial. Nei ther situation can be ruled out by the data. Perhaps the use of independent cues for recalling the original responses would help to identify which processes are mainly re sponsible for the effect in the aided condition (see An derson, 2003 ) . Anderson and Green's (200 I) use of inde pendent cues was essential to their argument that inhibition is responsible for forgetting in the think/no-think para digm. And inhibition from the retrieval of substitutes might similarly be revealed. Next, we note that the data in the unaided condition conceptually replicated the findings of below-baseline suppression obtained by Anderson and Green (200 I ; see also Anderson et al., 2004) , if participants reported com-: pliance with instructions for suppression. As compared with baseline, they forgot responses subjected to sup� pression attempts, although not significantly so. follow ing _12 attempts and clearly not as well as did the aided participants given 12 attempts. Even more interesting was the conceptual replication by the participants who reportedly used a thought substitution strategy and sub sequently showed levels of forgetting siinilarto those ob tained in the aided condition. Importantly, both findings of below-baseline suppression were obtained following many fewer suppression trials than those constituting Anderson and Green's suppression phase (2 and 12, as compared with I, 8, and 16). And unlike in Anderson and Green's studies, they were obtained from related cue-response pairs (as was the marginally significant ev idence of below-baseline suppression obtained by Hertel & Gerstle, 2003) . However, some recent attempts to replicate the effect have not been successful (e.g., Bule vich, Roediger, & Balota, 2003) , and the present results suggest that the size of the suppression effect might in deed depend on the use of self-initiated strategies. If a substantial number of participants choose strategies of noncompliance, the effect will certainly be weakened or .eliminated. On the other hand, if a substantial number of participants choose to think about something else while suppressing, perhaps not even explicit substitutes, the ef fect should clearly be obtained.
As a final note, the thought substitution strategy might be effective either due to practice in retrieving the sub stitutes (classic inhibition or interference explanations) or simply because the focus on some other matter keeps the temptation of ironic control at bay. The latter hypothesis would be supported indirectly by a significant inverse correlation between reports of noncompliance and reports of substitution use�a correlation that was nonsignifi cant in this experiment. Nevertheless, there should be more direct ways to discover whether thought substitu tion succeeds, at least in part, because an idle mind is the memory devil 's workshop.
